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THE SIBERIA OF THE MIND 
EGOISM IN THE WRITING OF WYNDHAM LEWIS  !!A	 room	held	 in	 a	 great	 northern	 city;	 nine	 foot	 by	 six,	 a	 typical	 student	 squat,	pipes	half-smoked,	bed	never-made,	books	piled	on	chair	and	table.	Two	are	 in	Finnish.	The	third,	‘stalely	open’,	Arghol	takes	up	to	shut.	It	is	the	Einige	und	Sein	
Eigenkeit	[sic].	‘One	of	the	seven	arrows’	in	this	‘martyr	mind’	–	only	this	book,	by	renegade	Hegelian	Max	Stirner,	is	named	by	Wyndham	Lewis,	and	rejected.	‘Poof!	he	Plung	it	out	of	the	window.’ 		1	 	 	 	 	The	gesture	is	timely.	According	to	Paul	Edwards,	in	his	account	of	the	artist,	‘Stirner	probably	had	 little	 lasting	 inPluence	upon	Lewis’. 	Unlike	other	 sources	2Edwards	cites	as	being	central	to	an	understanding	of	this	radical	“play”	entitled	‘Enemy	 of	 the	 Stars’,	 which	 appeared	 in	 the	 Vorticist	 journal	 BLAST	 in	 1914,	Stirner	is	not	referred	to	again,	does	not	survive	the	particularly	rough	handling	he	receives	in	this	play.	His	book	is	condemned	by	Arghol	as	a	‘parasite’,	with	all	the	other	books	in	the	room,	‘Poodles	of	the	mind,	Chows	and	King	Charles’,	and	is	therefore	torn	up	with	the	rest	–	left	in	‘a	pile	by	the	door	ready	to	sweep	out’. 		3	 	 	 	 	But	in	addition	to	marking	the	author’s	own	break	with	Stirner,	the	incident	curiously	anticipates	the	general	movement	away	from	the	philosophy	of	Egoism	that	would	take	place	during	the	war.	Having	enjoyed	a	period	of	intense	interest	in	the	English-speaking	world	following	the	publication	of	Byington’s	translation	in	1912,	The	Ego	and	His	Own	was	to	vanish	just	as	suddenly	into	obscurity	again,	as	writers	such	as	Joyce,	Lewis	and	Marsden	began	to	confront	problems	posed	by	new	materialist	theories	of	the	mind	(originating	in	Schopenhauer,	developed	over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 nineteenth-century	 by	 James	 and	 Bergson,	 and	 Pinding	their	culmination	in	the	Behaviourist	theory	of	the	C20th).	The	world	imagined	in	the	play	is	already	permeated	with	a	strong	sense	of	the	extent	to	which	mind	is	riddled	with	the	unconscious,	an	‘underworld	of	energy	and	rebellious	muscle’,	inextricably	involved	in	the	mechanism	of	a	material	universe	in	which	stars	are	‘machines	of	prey’. 		4	 	 	 	 	However,	Stirner	is	not	rejected	for	his	inadequacy,	in	the	face	of	this	radical	new	empiricist	paradigm,	but	for	precisely	the	reasons	underpinning	the	action	  	1
of	renunciation	in	Stirner’s	own	philosophy.	 ‘Arghol’s	egoism	is	not	the	same	as	Stirner’s,’	remarks	Edwards,	‘but	his	acts	of	repudiation	of	whatever	Pixes	his	ego	in	a	false	and	unalterable	shape	are	paralleled	by	Stirner’s	strategy	of	preventing	any	‘ideal’	or	‘property’	from	determining	his	ego’. 	The	joke	is	that	in	attempting	5to	effect	a	catharsis,	to	purify	ego	of	a	philosophy	which	has	been	recognised	as	parasitic,	 Lewis’s	 puppet	 is	 reiterating	 the	 very	 conditions	 that	 render	 such	 a	renunciation	 necessary	 –	 and	 this	 is	 rePlected	 in	 the	 way	 that	 Stirner’s	 book	
comes	back	–	to	be	rejected	over	and	over	again.	A	few	minutes	after	hurling	the	book	out	into	the	street	there	is	a	knock	at	the	door:	the	book	is	being	returned	by	a	shifting	Pigure	that	assumes	the	guise	of	personalities	that	Arghol	has	tried	to	 reject;	 the	 last	 being	 Stirner,	 as	 he	 imagines	 him:	 ‘A	 middle	 aged	 man,	 red	cropped	head	and	dark	eyes,	self=possessed,	loose,	free,	student-sailor,	Pingering	the	book.’ 	A	comedy	of	 inept	renunciation	 follows.	Stirner	 is	bribed	 to	 ‘go’,	but	6believes	 he	 is	 being	 offered	 the	money	 for	 the	 book.	 This	 provokes	 a	 stinging	rejoinder	from	the	Hegelian.	He	Plings	the	book	at	his	disciple’s	head	–	‘its	cover	slaps	him	sharply’	–	and	a	scufPle	ensues,	resulting	in	Stirner’s	eviction. 	7	 	 	 	 	The	book’s	capacity	for	returning	unexpectedly	is	just	as	resonant	as	the	fact	of	its	rejection;	–	for	the	reception	history	of	The	Ego	and	His	Own	has	been	a	sort	of	haunting.	Having	returned,	in	the	pre-war	era,	from	an	obscurity	so	complete	that	Marx	and	Engels,	 Stirner’s	 contemporaries,	did	not	even	bother	 to	publish	the	refutation	they	had	produced	(The	German	Ideology),	the	book	has	persisted	ever	since,	a	ghost-like	presence,	only	acknowledged	in	the	moment	of	refutation	or	 disavowal.	 And	 I	would	 like	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 deeply	 inadequate	 exorcism	performed	by	Arghol	in	The	Enemy	of	the	Stars	in	1914,	could	serve	as	a	symbol	for	 Lewis’s	 own	 relationship	with	 this	 early	 inPluence	 in	 the	 four	monumental	books	that	author	produced	in	the	inter-war	era:	The	Art	of	Being	Ruled	(1926),	
Time	and	Western	Man	(1927),	Childermass	(1928)	and	The	Apes	of	God	(1930).	Long	after	Stirner	is	thought	to	have	ceased	to	matter	 in	Lewis’s	writing,	visual	imagery	that,	 in	the	pre-war	material,	 is	quite	clearly	derived	from	The	Ego	and	
His	Own,	 can	be	seen	 to	persist,	 in	 relation	 to	a	 recurring	pattern	of	associated	ideas.	Edwards	has	speculated	that	Lewis’s	 later	interest	 in	anthropology	might	be	rooted	in	Stirner:	‘It	is	possible’,	says	Edwards,	‘that	Stirner’s	characterisation	of	 philosophical	 idealism	 as	 a	 variety	 of	 “Mongolian”	 shamanism	 led	 Lewis	 to	
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ethnological	 accounts	 such	as	Mary	Czaplicka’s,	 on	Siberia	 (which	he	quotes	 in	
The	Art	of	Being	Ruled)’. 	In	fact,	the	development	of	this	trope	–	that	of	Siberian	8shamanism	–	in	the	later	theoretical	writing	has	been	very	helpful	in	facilitating	the	interpretation	of	much	that	had	been	left	obscure	in	The	Enemy	of	the	Stars,	particularly	those	passages	relating	to	gender.	The	following	essay	suggests	that	the	speciPically	Stirnerian	take	on	shamanism	in	the	pre-war	work	is	 likewise	a	potential	aid	to	understanding	the	writing	of	the	twenties,	that	Stirner	might	well	provide	the	“key”	that	many	commentators	have	felt	to	be	‘missing’	from	The	Art	
of	Being	Ruled	and	the	rest.	 In	the	course	of	 tracing	what	remains	of	 the	Egoist	paradigm	in	Lewis’s	great	period,	 this	essay	establishes	that	Stirner	persisted	a	
revenant	to	trouble	the	literature	of	modernism	more	generally	in	the	inter-war	era.			
! *		 *	 *	
!Begin	with	this	summary:	–	what	is	known	concerning	the	shamanism	of	Siberia	in	The	Enemy	of	 the	Stars.	The	play	 is	set	 in	a	wheelwright’s	yard,	 two	hundred	miles	south	of	the	Arctic	circle. 	Here	Arghol	has	come	to	work	for	his	uncle,	and	9is	kicked	to	within	an	inch	of	his	life	by	this	‘super’	once	every	twenty-four	hours.	Since	arriving	he	has	acquired	a	disciple	called	Hanp,	who	despises	his	hero	for	his	weakness	and	envies	him	for	his	 former	social	 life	 in	Berlin.	The	characters	are	of	a	physical	type	taken	‘from	broad	faces	where	Europe	grows	arctic,	intense,	human	and	universal’. 	Such	references	to	the	Asian	steppes	occur	throughout.	10At	one	point,	in	what	must	be	quite	literally	the	most	far-fetched	metaphor	in	the	play,	Arghol	 and	Hanp	are	 even	 compared	 to	 a	dancing-girl	 and	her	Mongolian	overlord.		
!‘Harsh	bayadere=shepherdess	of	Pamir,	with	her	Chinese	beauty:	living	on	from	month	to	month	in	utmost	tent	with	wastrel,	lean	as	mandrake	root,	red	and	precocious:	with	heavy	black	odour	of	vast	Manchurian	garden-deserts,	 and	 the	 disreputable	muddy	 gold	 squandered	 by	 the	 unknown	sun	of	the	Amur’. 		11!Marked	for	 ‘fate	of	sovereign	prostitution’,	Arghol	 is	 the	 ‘bayadere=shepherdess	of	Pamir’;	repeatedly	likened	to	a	woman,	the	character	is	said	to	project	a	‘TYPE	
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OF	FEMININE	BEAUTY	CALLED	“MANISH”’. 	The	reasoning	underlying	these	passages	12becomes	clearer	when	one	considers	the	text	in	relation	to	Lewis’s	later	writing	on	shamanic	magic	in	The	Art	of	Being	Ruled,	where	he	explains	that	‘Throughout	the	entire	history	of	 the	subject,	homosexuality	and	male	transformation	of	sex	have	been	more	or	 less	associated	in	men’s	minds	with	magic	and	witchcraft’. 	13Over	 the	 course	 of	 two	 chapters	 Lewis	 argues	 that	 the	 Shaman	 is	 the	 logical	result	 of	 a	 common	 belief	 among	 primitive	 peoples	 in	 the	 superior	 magical	power	women	possess	over	men.	In	such	circumstances,	says	Lewis,	it	is	natural	men	should	have	come	to	think	that	one	of	the	Pirst	steps	towards	a	career	as	a	magician	was	to	change	their	sex.	‘It	is	the	example	of	a	far-sighted	calculation	or	strategy:	 one	 of	 the	maddest	 Plights	 of	 primitive	 human	 cunning	 attempting	 to	harness	supernatural	energy	by	a	feigning,	for	the	easily	deceived	powers	of	the	natural	world,	of	femininity.’ 		14	 	 	 	 	For	 the	Vorticist	such	an	 ‘escape	by	artiPice	 from	the	 iron	rules	of	physical	laws’,	must	 necessarily	merit	 some	measure	 of	 praise. 	 The	 achievement	 is,	 at	15the	very	least,	on	a	par	with	that	of	the	hairdresser	blessed	in	Lewis’s	journal:	‘He	attacks	Mother	Nature	for	a	small	 fee	…	correcting	the	grotesque	anachronisms	of	 our	 physique’. 	 In	 The	 Caliph’s	 Design	 (1919),	 a	 manifesto	 for	 a	 new	16architecture	 published	 shortly	 after	 WWI,	 Lewis	 remarked	 the	 creative	capabilities	 of	 certain	 beetles,	 their	 capacity	 for	 turning	 form	 and	 colour	impulses	into	living	Plesh:		
! These	beetles	can	convert	their	faces	into	hideously	carved	and	detestable	masks,	can	grow	out	of	their	bodies	menacing	spikes,	and	throw	up	on	top	of	 their	 heads	 sinister	 headdresses,	 overnight.	 Such	 changes	 in	 their	personal	 appearance,	 conceived	 to	 work	 on	 the	 psychology	 of	 their	adversaries,	 is	possibly	not	a	very	profound	or	useful	 invention,	but	 it	 is	surely	a	considerable	feat.	Any	art	worth	the	name	is,	at	the	least,	a	feat	of	this	description.	The	New	Guinea	barred	and	whitewashed	masks	are	an	obvious	parallel.	As	to	the	wing	mechanism	that	Pirst	lifted	a	creature	off	the	ground,	and	set	 it	 spinning	or	 Ploating	 through	 the	air,	you	must	call	Shakespeare	in	to	compete	with	it. 		17!The	 Shaman’s	 achievement	 is	 of	 the	 same	 order.	 ‘The	 actual	 appearance	 of	 a	transformed	shaman	is	not	that	of	the	“mongolian”	imbecile	of	our	clinics,	but	is	a	mask	of	Pixed	wild	pathos’,	writes	Lewis:	 ‘Borgoraz	describes	it	exactly	when	he	
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says	 it	 is	 a	 female	mask	 of	 tragedy.’ 	 Like	 the	Oceanic	masks	 that	 Picasso	 and	18Epstein	imitated	in	their	art,	the	transformative	magic	practiced	by	the	Shaman	upon	his	own	body	is	hailed	by	Lewis	as	a	prototype	of	modern	art.	In	Time	and	
Western	 Man	 (1927),	 Lewis	 states	 that	 ‘creative	 art	 is	 a	 spell,	 a	 talisman,	 an	incantation	–	that	it	is	magic,	in	short’,	and	notes	that	‘The	poet	or	philosopher	in	the	non-religious	greek	states	occupied,	we	are	told,	much	the	same	position	as	the	 priest	 or	 witch-doctor	 or	 magician	 in	 a	 more	 religious	 or	 superstitious	community’. 	He	concludes	that,	‘For	me	art	is	the	civilised	substitute	for	magic;	19as	 philosophy	 is	 what,	 on	 a	 higher	 or	more	 complex	 plane,	 takes	 the	 place	 of	religion’. 		20	 	 	 	 	Note	though:	this	distinction	is	not	perfectly	clear	in	The	Caliph’s	Design	and	
The	Art	of	Being	Ruled.	Lewis	repeatedly	attempts	to	conPlate	the	‘Arctic	Hysteria’	of	the	Shaman	with	what	he	considered	throughout	his	life	to	be	the	very	highest	form	of	literary	art:	the	nineteenth-century	Russian	novel.	‘The	epileptic	naïf	and	mystical	 element’,	 speculates	 Lewis	 in	 The	 Art	 of	 Being	 Ruled,	 ‘in	 nearly	 all	nineteenth-century	russian	literature	has	no	doubt	some	relation	to	this	extreme	inconstancy	and	collapsibility	of	the	Siberian	peoples’. 	 In	BLAST	1,	Lewis	even	21goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 suggest	 that	his	 reason	 for	 ‘very	genuine	optimism’	 regarding	the	potential	of	radical	art	 in	England,	consists	primarily	 in	the	extent	to	which	latter	 resembles	 Siberia:	 ‘England	 is	 just	 as	 unkind	 and	 inimical	 to	 Art	 as	 the	Arctic	 zone	 is	 to	 Life’,	 Lewis	 explains.	 ‘As	 the	 steppes	 and	 the	 rigours	 of	 the	Russian	winter,	when	the	peasant	has	 to	 lie	 for	weeks	 in	his	hut,	produces	that	extraordinary	 acuity	 of	 feeling	 and	 intelligence	 we	 associate	 with	 the	 Slav;	 so	England	 is	 just	now	 the	most	 favourable	 country	 for	 the	 appearance	of	 a	 great	art’. 	In	being	described	in	terms	that	suggest	he	is	a	form	of	Shaman,	is	subject	22to	this	‘Arctic	hysteria’,	Arghol	might	then	be	taken	to	be	a	symbol	of	the	modern	artist	in	that	‘Siberia	of	the	mind’	that	is	England. 	23					In	what	is	the	seminal	reading	of	this	extraordinarily	difPicult	piece	of	writing,	Edwards	suggests	that	the	Siberian	imagery	in	Lewis	derives	from	the	schematic	history	provided	by	Stirner	in	The	Ego	and	His	Own	–	in	which	he	identiPies	three	phases.	According	to	Stirner,	we	escape	from	our	“Negroid”	state	of	subservience	to	the	material	fact	by	entering	a	second,	rather	more	subtle	state	of	submission	to	things	of	the	spirit	or	mind;	these	being	gods	and	spirits	at	Pirst,	then	concepts	
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such	as	the	“State”,	“love”	and	“Humanity”,	for	the	sake	of	which	people	continue	to	practice	self-renunciation.	‘The	shaman	and	the	speculative	philosopher	mark	the	 bottom	 and	 top	 rounds’,	 according	 to	 Stirner,	 ‘on	 the	 ladder	 of	 the	 inward	man,	 the	 –	Mongol’. 	 The	 third	 phase	 is	 the	 “Caucasian”,	 and	 is	 to	 come	 about	24now	that	people	begin	to	perceive	that	their	own	unique	ego	is	the	one	absolute.	Thus	Arghol,	 ‘a	gladiator	who	has	come	to	Pight	a	ghost,	Humanity’,	 is	a	shaman	or	 philosopher,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 he	 remains	 one	 of	 those	 who	 ‘Pight	 with	 ghosts,	demons,	 spirits,	 gods.’ 	 But	 this	 ‘one	 in	 immense	 collapse’	 is	 equally	 the	 Pinal	25result	of	Stirner’s	‘chronic	philosophy’. 	In	Edwards’	memorable	phase,	‘Arghol	is	26the	 last	 shaman,	 struggling	 to	 realise	 the	 last	 remnant	 of	 the	 transcendental	world	of	spirits,	the	Ego	itself ’. 		27					A	note	on	‘The	New	Egos’,	published	with	‘The	Enemy	of	the	Stars’	in	BLAST	1,	provides	us	with	insights	into	how	Lewis	himself	interpreted	Stirner’s	historical	schema.	 ‘A	 civilised	 savage,	 in	 a	 desert=city,’	 he	 begins,	 ‘surrounded	 by	 very	simple	objects	 and	 restricted	number	of	beings,	 reduces	his	Great	Art	down	 to	the	simple	black	human	bullet’.	He	characterises	such	sculpture	as	 ‘African’	and	states	we	have	nothing	to	do	with	such	sculpture.	‘The	African	we	have	referred	to	 cannot	 allow	 his	 personality	 to	 venture	 forth	 or	 amplify	 itself,	 for	 it	 would	dissolve	in	vagueness	of	space’,	he	writes.	 ‘It	has	to	be	swaddled	in	a	bullet=like	lump.’	In	contrast,	the	‘modern	town=dweller	of	our	civilisation	sees	everywhere	fraternal	moulds	for	his	spirit,	and	interstices	of	a	human	world’.	We	supplant	the	natural	with	a	second	man-made	reality;	and	though	life	is	really	no	more	secure,	his	egotism	less	acute,	society	is	sufPiciently	organised	for	him	to	permit	‘his	ego	to	 walk	 abroad’,	 until	 something	 akin	 to	 the	 self-effacement	 the	 Egoist	philosopher	denounced	–	that	which	Lewis	terms	impersonality	–	becomes	a	sort	of	 disease.	 ‘Promiscuity	 is	 normal;	 such	 separating	 things	 as	 love,	 hatred,	friendship	are	superseded	by	a	more	realistic	and	logical	passion’,	Lewis	claims.	‘We	all	to=day	(possibly	with	a	coldness	reminiscent	of	the	insect=world)	are	in	each	other’s	vitals	–	overlap,	intersect,	and	are	Siamese	to	any	extent’.	According	to	 Lewis,	 the	 result	 is	 that	 the	 old	 variety	 of	 egotism	 is	 ‘no	 longer	 Pit	 for	 such	conditions	as	now	prevail’;	though	the	‘human	form’	continues	to	run	like	a	wave	through	 the	 ‘texture	 or	 body	 of	 existence,	 and	 therefore	 of	 art’,	 the	 isolated	human	Pigure	of	most	ancient	art	(the	‘African’?)	is	‘an	anachronism’	that	should	
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now	be	superseded.	The	character	of	these	‘New	Egos’,	and	the	new	art	that	must	result,	 is	not	spelt	out.	But	Lewis	seems	to	provide	 further	details	on	this	 third	phase	in	The	Ideal	Giant,	a	play	that	appeared	in	The	Little	Review	in	1917,	when	his	spokesman	John	Porter	Kemp	states	the	New	Egos	belong	to	either	the	Crowd	or	to	the	Artist.	Each	is	an	Ideal	Giant	–	at	once	singular	and	many	–	representing	two	different	ways	of	reconciling	naïve	egotism	and	impersonal	truth. 		28					In	Edwards’	reading	Arghol	emerges	as	a	problematic	Pigure.	On	the	one	hand,	he	is	making	the	right	noises,	echoing	Stirner’s	complaint	that	every	ego	is	from	birth	a	criminal	to	begin	with	against	the	people,	the	State	or	Mankind	in	general,	in	saying	that:		
! Self,	sacred	act	of	violence,	is	like	murder	on	my	face	and	hands.	The	stain	won’t	 come	 out.	 It	 is	 the	 one	 piece	 of	 property	 all	 communities	 have	agreed	 it	 is	 illegal	 to	 posses.	 The	 sweetest=tempered	 person,	 once	 he	discovers	you	are	that	sort	of	criminal,	changes	any	opinion	of	you,	and	is	on	his	guard. 	29!But	the	plan	of	action	pursued	by	Arghol	seems	calculated	to	bafPle	and	infuriate	the	philosopher	he	rejected.	Having	observed	he	loses	something	of	his	authentic	Self	in	the	course	of	everyday	social	interaction,	Arghol	has	resolved	to	shrink	in	‘frosty	 climates’	 the	 ‘immense	 snufPling	 or	 taciturn	 parasite’	 that	 battens	 upon	him:	 the	 ‘loathsome	deformity’	 of	 a	 second	or	 social	 Self. 	 Like	 Stirner,	Arghol	30perceives	that	to	‘walk	abroad’	is	to	risk	an	‘afPliction	got	through	indiscriminate	rubbing	 against	 [his	 fellows]’,	 the	 ‘Famous	men	 are	 those	who	have	 exchanged	themselves	against	a	thousand	idiots’	until	the	‘bastard	form’	infects	the	‘original	solitude	of	the	soul’. 	But	the	steps	he	takes	in	order	to	preserve	his	ego	from	the	31impersonality	 of	 the	 modern	 town-dweller’s	 insect-world	 mark	 a	 signiPicant	break	with	the	path	toward	the	realisation	of	the	Ideal	Giant.	Arghol	has	resolved	to	 ‘Accumulate	 in	 myself,	 day	 after	 day,	 dense	 concentration	 of	 pig-life’.	 With	‘Nothing	spent,	stored	rather	 in	strong	stagnation’,	he	hopes	to	be	 ‘rid	at	 last	of	evaporation	and	lightness	characteristic	of	men’,	and	‘So	burst	Death’s	membrane	through,	slog	beyond,	not	Ploat	in	appalling	distances’. 	In	short,	Arghol	pursues	32a	 rearguard	rather	 than	a	vanguard	action	–	pushing	back	 toward	 the	phase	of	the	civilised	savage	who	‘cannot	allow	his	personality	to	venture	forth	or	amplify	
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itself,	 for	 it	 would	 dissolve	 in	 vagueness	 of	 space’	 –	 has	 resolved	 to	 swaddle	‘himself	in	a	bullet=like	lump’. 		33	 	 	 	 	 In	Edwards’	persuasive	explanation	of	 ‘The	Enemy	of	the	Stars’	(developed	further	by	Andrej	Gasiorek),	the	Pirst	and	secondary	phases	in	Stirner’s	historical	template	are	conPlated	with	the	dualistic	opposition	of	matter	and	spirit	set	out	in	Schopenhauer’s	The	World	as	Will	and	Idea	–	and	which	is	ultimately	derived	from	sources	either	Hindu	or	Gnostic.	Arghol	 is	 ‘something	distant,	terrible	and	eccentric’	–	 i.e.	 the	spirit	or	the	divine	spark	that	must	be	 ‘struck	and	banished	from	matter’. 	But	this	Sophia	is	–	perversely,	Schopenhauer	would	say	–	trying	34to	maintain	her	hold	on	the	enemy	territory	of	the	stars	or	archons:	the	material	universe.	Arghol	can	only	hope	to	maintain	his	precious	individuality	by	holding	the	middle-ground	between	two	mighty	opposites:	the	ghosts	of	Future	Mankind	being	at	one	with	the	red	walls	of	the	universe	that	close	in	upon	this	condemned	protagonist. 	The	signiPicance	of	this	defeat	is	open	to	question.	Edwards	notes	35that	 the	 text	 will	 not	 permit	 us	 to	 afPirm	 ‘either	 that	 Arghol	 is	 a	 critique	 of	Stirner’s	egoism	[…]	or	that	Arghol	is	revealed	as	a	deluded	character	by	Stirner’s	denunciation	of	his	spiritual	and	ascetic	ideals’. 	But	the	inevitably	of	this	failure	36is	never	 in	question.	BLAST	 is	a	 ‘magazine	programmatically	 contradictory	and	hence	 dualist’. 	 The	 outcome	 of	 the	 play	 is	 precisely	 ‘what	 one	 would	 expect	37from	an	artist	like	Lewis	who	was	sceptical	about	fantasies	of	the	transcendence	of	dualism’. 	 In	his	hugely	 inPluential	 appraisal	of	 the	play,	Edwards	notes	 that	38Vorticism	‘was	not	a	movement	that	sought	to	transcend	dualities,	but	to	exploit	them.’ 		39					In	relation	to	the	play	this	interpretation	may	be	regarded	as	perfectly	correct.	The	universe	Arghol	 inhabits	 is	 truly	 the	creation	of	a	demiurge	–	a	minor	and	malicious	god	–	that	 is	to	say,	Lewis	himself.	 In	a	sketch	to	accompany	the	text,	Lewis	depicts	Arghol	as	a	sculpture	of	the	sort	his	friend	Henri	Gaudier-Brzeska	might	have	created,	a	cross	between	a	totem	and	a	Swiss-army	knife.	In	the	text	too,	 Arghol	 is	 described	 in	 terms	 that	 recall	 Epstein’s	 Venus-Pigures:	 a	 ‘barren	muscular	girl	 idol’.	His	head	is	that	of	a	 ‘black,	eagerly	carved,	herculean	Venus’,	the	fetish	of	an	‘iron	tribe,	hyper	barbarous.’	‘Head	heavy	and	bird=like,	weighted	to	 strike’. 	Arghol	 is	a	puppet	 that	 cannot	progress	beyond	 the	booth	or	arena	40that	dePines	 the	action,	but	must	remain	 inescapably	caught	between	mind	and	
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matter,	that	is	to	say,	between	the	printed	page	and	the	reader,	the	‘me’	and	‘you’	in	the	preface	said	to	perform	this	play	‘very	well’.	If	Arghol	is	unable	to	project	the	‘Ideal	Giant’	that	seems	to	correspond	to	those	‘New	Egos’	in	the	third	phase	of	the	Stirnerian	teleology,	this	may	explain	why.	Arghol	is	a	portrait	of	the	artist	(as	a	young	shaman);	is	a	symbol	merely	–	of	that	symbol	for	the	modern	artist;	he	is	an	objet	d’art.						Indeed,	it	is	tempting	to	consider	Arghol	in	relation	to	Lewis’s	essay	on	puppet	theatre	in	his	collection	of	short	stories	The	Wild	Body	(1927).	In	this	piece	Lewis	introduces	the	puppets	that	appear	in	the	stories	as	carefully	selected	specimens	of	religious	fanaticism,	worshippers	of	some	fetish	(a	set	of	objects	or	one	object	in	particular)	that	requires	an	unvarying	ritual	behaviour.	‘Boswell’s	Johnson,	Mr.	Vennering,	 Malvolio,	 Bouvard	 and	 Pecuchet,	 the	 “commissaire”	 in	 Crime	 and	Punishment,	 do	 not	 live’,	 Lewis	 explains:	 ‘they	 are	 congealed	 and	 frozen	 into	logic,	and	an	exuberant	hysterical	truth’. 	Lewis	then	describes	these	puppets	in	41terms	that	evoke	the	Siberian	imagery	developed	in	‘The	Enemy	of	the	Stars’.	‘The	chemistry	of	personality’,	he	writes,	 ‘(subterranean	in	a	sort	of	cemetery,	whose	decompositions	 are	 our	 lives)	 puffs	 up	 in	 frigid	 balls,	 soapy	 Snowmen,	 arctic	carnival-masks,	 which	 we	 can	 photograph	 and	 Pix’. 	 But	 if	 this	 conPirms	 that	42Arghol	is	trapped	in	a	Manichaean	universe	he	cannot	hope	to	transcend,	Lewis	also	seems	to	be	suggesting	here	that	these	decompositions	are	our	lives.	No	less	than	Arghol,	Lewis	considers	us	all	to	be	snowmen	rather	than	shaman,	however	arctic	our	carnival-mask.		
! First,	 to	 assume	 the	 dichotomy	 of	 mind	 and	 body	 is	 necessary	 here,	without	arguing	it;	for	it	is	upon	that	essential	separation	that	the	theory	of	laughter	here	proposed	is	based.	The	essential	us,	that	is	the	laugher,	is	as	distinct	 from	the	Wild	Body	as	 in	 the	Upanisadic	account	of	 the	souls	returned	from	the	paradise	of	 the	Moon,	which,	entering	 into	plants,	are	yet	 distinct	 from	 them.	 Or	 to	 take	 the	 symbolic	 vedic	 Pigure	 of	 the	 two	birds,	 the	 one	 watching	 and	 passive,	 the	 other	 enjoying	 its	 activity,	 we	similarly	have	to	postulate	two	creatures,	one	that	never	enters	 into	 life,	but	 that	 travels	 about	 in	 a	 vessel	 to	 whose	 destiny	 it	 is	 momentarily	attached.	 That	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	 laughing	 observer,	 and	 the	 other	 is	 the	Wild	Body. 	43! *		 *	 *	
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In	this	essay	I	want	to	break	with	the	prevailing	interpretation	to	argue	that	there	persists	 between	 the	 polarities	 something	 more	 signiPicant	 than	 the	 ‘dead	perfection’	of	a	puppet’s	 ‘egotism’,	some	other	possibility	beyond	that	recursion	to	a	fetish-object. 	For	in	that	same	book,	The	Wild	Body,	Lewis	also	celebrates	44the	 ‘universal	 ego	 of	 the	 poet’;	 he	 is	 clearly	 not	 relinquishing	 his	 faith	 in	 a	speciPically	Stirnerian	synthesis	when	he	praises	that	‘one	synthetic	and	various	ego’. 	 It	 is	worth	 recalling	 here	 the	 distinction	 between	person	 and	 individual	45the	Bailiff	 insists	upon	in	The	Childermass.	The	personality	of	which	Arghol	and	Lewis	speak	in	 ‘The	Enemy	of	the	Stars’	and	‘Inferior	Religions’	 is:	 ‘that	crusted	fruity	complex-and-Pinite	reality	–	term	by	which	we	are	accustomed	to	express	the	sensations	of	our	empirical	life	–	emerging	in	the	matrix	of	Space	and	Time	or	Space-Time’. 	The	personality	might	be	said	 to	present	a	realist	perspective	on	46the	Subject	–	and	individuality,	the	idealist.	‘Individuality	then	is	identity	without	the	idea	of	substance’,	the	Bailiff	explains	(before	observing	this	is	out	of	fashion	in	the	post-war	era:	‘It	is	not	the	persistent	life	of	a	bare	universal	that	any	man,	ever,	is	likely	to	covet.’) 	And	as	R.D.	Laing	observed,	in	The	Divided	Self	(1959),	47there	is	no	question	here	or	anywhere	of	body-mind	dualism,	only	two	different	ways	 of	 regarding	 the	 one	 thing,	 ‘each	 the	 outcome	 of	 one’s	 initial	 intentional	act’. 	 That	 one	universal	 and	 synthetic	 ego	of	which	Lewis	 speaks	 in	The	Wild	48
Body	can	 therefore	be	neither	personality	nor	 individuality	 thus	dePined.	When	Arghol	 opposes	 personality	 to	 mankind	 in	 the	 following	 passage,	 it	 is	 not	 the	Stirnerian	ego	to	which	he	refers,	but	to	that	ego	as	posited.	Not	that	nothing	that	permits	me	to	stand	apart,	that	separates	myself,	from	what	I	am,	but	that	which	I	am,	that	being	I	represent	me	to	myself	as	being	my	cause,	my	sake,	my	persona	
! Between	 Personality	 and	Mankind	 it	 is	 always	 a	 question	 of	 dog	 &	 cat;	they	 are	 diametrically	 opposed	 species.	 Self	 is	 the	 ancient	 race,	 the	 rest	are	 the	 new	 one.	 Self	 is	 the	 race	 that	 lost.	 But	 Mankind	 still	 suspects	Egotistic	plots,	and	hunts	Pretenders’. 		49!	 	 	 	 	No	doubt	everyone	 is,	potentially,	a	Quixote	/	Falstaff	/	Pecksniff	/	Arghol.	Such	comic	types	are	part	of	our	own	organism:	an	imitation	and	standardizing	of	self	that	implies	the	existence	of	a	human	norm. 	–	Nonetheless	every	living	50being	possesses	(in	varying	degrees)	the	power	to	be	a	creator,	a	minor	god.	In	a	
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series	 of	 ‘Imaginary	 Letters’,	 published	 in	The	 Little	 Review	 (May	 1917	 –	 April	1918),	Lewis	expresses,	through	his	surrogate	William	Bland	Burn,	his	belief	that	the	writer	such	as	Shakespeare	or	Cervantes	is	a	‘Colossus’	capable	of	projecting	the	 sort	 of	 ‘play-world’	 that	 those	 who	 have	 chosen	 to	 settle	 for	 being	 mere	puppets	can	only	hope	to	inhabit.	‘Wherever	they	go,	there	is	a	great	crowd	with	them.	Their	brain	is	the	record	of	their	sympathies,	people	pour	in	and	are	piled	up,	 with	 a	 persistent	 classiPication,	 until	 giant-like	 and	 permanent	 images,	 the	‘types’	of	drama	or	Piction	are	produced’. 	The	New	Egos	are	not	transcendental,	51but	they	are	ecstatic	–	possessing	a	capacity	for	standing	forth	from	the	polarities	(or	rather	perspectives)	of	body	and	soul	–	of	personality	and	impersonality	–	in	order	to	project	a	world.							Lewis	develops	these	ideas	further,	in	his	book	Time	and	Western	Man	(1927).	In	a	chapter	on	‘God	as	Reality’,	Lewis	insists	that,	as	‘surface-creatures’,	we	must	reject	 those	philosophies	 that	predict	 or	 seek	 to	 effect	 transcendental	 union	 in	the	 Absolute	 Synthesis.	 ‘For	 such	 departures	 result	 in	 self-destruction,	 just	 as	though	 we	 hurled	 ourself	 into	 space	 –	 into	 “mental-space,”	 if	 you	 like,	 in	 this	case.’ 	If	Lewis	believes	in	an	Absolute	(or	God),	he	nevertheless	believes	that	it	52is	probably	better,	perhaps	even	more	truthful,	to	pretend	otherwise.	‘This	must	be	 so	 for	 things	 to	 be	 bearable	 at	 all	 for	 us	 as	 creatures:	 for	 such	 unrelieved	intimacy	as	would	otherwise	exist,	such	perpetual	society	–	of	such	a	pervasive,	psychic,	overwhelming	kind	–	would	not	be	socially	possible.’ 	If	there	is	a	God,	53the	very	act	of	 creation,	 in	Lewis’s	 system,	necessarily	 required	His	abdication.	‘He	 apparently	 no	 longer	wished	 to	 be	 “the	Absolute”.’ 	 This	 is	 no	 deprivation	54but	 a	 ‘princely	 gift’	 that	 permits	 every	 one	 of	 us	 to	 realise	 our	 own	 absolute	uniqueness:		
!Human	individuality	is	best	regarded	as	a	kind	of	artiPicial	godhood.	When	most	intensely	separated	from	our	neighbours	and	from	all	other	things	–	most	 “ourselves,”	 as	 we	 say	 –	 we	 are	 farthest	 away,	 clearly,	 from	 an	Absolute,	or	any	kind	of	Unity.	Yet,	in	another	sense,	we	are	nearest	to	it.’ 	55!It	is	thus	still	possible	to	believe	in	a	Pirst-hand	experience	of	the	divine	in	human	life.	 Dismissing	 those	 ‘vulgar	 delusions’	 that	 privilege	 quantity,	 duration	 and	scale,	Lewis	presents	a	radical	take	on	Stirner’s	philosopy	of	“creative	negation”,	suggesting	that	we	come	closest	to	that	nothingness-that-is-God-for-us	in	the	act	  	11
of	creation:	–	 ‘no	Absolute	need	be	ashamed	of	the	feelings	or	thoughts	of	what	we	call	a	great	artist	or	a	great	poet’. 		56
! To	be	at	once	perfectly	 concrete,	we	can	assert	 that	a	God	 that	 swam	 in	such	an	atmosphere	as	 is	produced	by	the	music	of	a	Bach	 fugue,	or	 the	stormy	 grandeur	 of	 the	 genii	 in	 the	 Sistine	 Ceiling,	 or	 the	 scene	 of	 the	Judgement	of	Signorelli	at	Orvieto,	who	moved	with	the	grace	of	Mozart	–	anyone	may	 for	himself	 accumulate	 such	comparisons	 from	 the	greatest	forms	of	art	–	such	a	God	would	be	the	highest	we	could	imagine… 	57!					The	history	of	Pierpoint	in	The	Apes	of	God	(1930)	provides	us	with	an	insight	into	 how	 this	 distinctively	 Lewisian	 twist	 on	 Stirner’s	 theories	might	 play	 out.	Pierpoint	has	removed	himself	from	London’s	“artistic”	circles	prior	to	the	start	of	the	narration;	has	since	been	successful	in	maintaining	that	absolute	isolation	Lewis	considers	to	be	a	prerequisite	to	artistic	success.	His	relation	to	the	novel	is	therefore	something	like	that	of	the	artist	in	relation	to	his	work;	the	degraded	society	he	reviews	might	be	said	to	constitute	his	own	composition.	So	Pierpoint	settles	 any	 lingering	 doubts	 we	 might	 entertain	 concerning	 the	 situation	 that	Arghol	struggles	with	 in	 ‘Enemy	of	 the	Stars’.	 In	a	 letter	circulated	by	Pierpoint	(referred	 to	 as	 an	 ‘encyclical’),	 the	 artist	 begins	 by	 insisting	 upon,	 rather	 than	seeking	 to	 slur	 over,	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 too	 is	 a	 party;	 Pierpoint	 is	 (no	 less	 than	ourselves	or	Arghol)	part	of	the	universe	he	is	attempting	to	withdraw	from,	but	this	presents	the	true	artist	with	no	impediment	to	his	apotheosis.		
! [It]	is	from	amongst	the	parties	that	the	acting	judge	is	ultimately	chosen.	Where	 else	 should	 you	 get	 him	 from?	 The	 supreme	 judge	 is	 constantly	absent.	What	we	call	a	judge	is	a	successful	partisan.	It	is	on	account	of	the	superior	percentage	of	truth	in	the	composition	of	your	glosses	that	your	statement	 is	 erected	 into	 a	 standard.	 And	 ‘Of	 an	 opinion	 which	 is	 no	longer	doubted,	 the	 evidence	 ceases	 to	 be	 examined.’	 The	 Pinding	 of	 the	supreme	judge	would	automatically	dissolve	us	all	into	limbo. 					58!	 	 	 	 	But	having	rePined	himself	out	of	existence	this	god	is	not	content	to	remain	behind	or	within	or	above	his	handiwork,	to	be	as	the	Joycean	artist,	indifferent,	paring	his	Pingernails.	‘I	am	not	in	agreement	with	the	current	belief	in	a	strained	“impersonality”	as	the	secret	of	artistic	success’,	states	Pierpoint.	An	opinion	that	Lewis	himself	expressed	in	his	critical	appraisal	of	T.S.	Eliot	 in	Men	Without	Art	
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(1934).	 In	 line	with	 the	approach	advocated	 in	 that	work,	Pierpoint	 intervenes	repeatedly,	 ‘broadcasting’	his	opinions	 indirectly	–	via	 the	medium	of	a	puppet,	that	is	to	say,	his	voice	carries	clearest	through	everything	that	the	artist	is	not.	‘The	Plourishing	and	bombastic	role	that	you	may	sometimes	see	me	in,	that	is	an	effect	of	chance’,	Pierpoint	explains.	‘Or	it	is	a	caricature	of	some	constant	Pigure	in	the	audience,	rather	than	what	I	am	(in	any	sense)	myself.	Or,	to	make	myself	clearer,	it	is	my	opposite.’ 	To	underline	the	point,	Pierpoint	begins	to	broadcast	59through	rival	personas	toward	the	end	of	the	book.	The	two	could	not	present	a	greater	contrast.	Starr-Smith	is	a	Fascist	Welshman:	a	tightly	wound	chauvinism	that	threatens	imminent	explosion,	this	Pigure	suggests	the	‘simple	black	human	bullet’	of	the	‘civilised	savage’	in	BLAST	1.	Horace	Zagreus,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	former	actor	and	a	part-time	magician,	acutely	aware	of	his	own	emptiness	and	happy	 to	 play	 his	 part	 as	 a	 conduit	 for	 unknown	 powers:	 his	 ‘polar-pelt’	 and	transformational	magic	recall	 the	early	writing	on	 the	Shaman’s	 ‘arctic	carnival	mask’.	Having	apparently	managed	to	evade	Pixation	as	either	a	fetish-object	or	a	trepanned	skull,	the	living	ego	is	interjecting	both	false	alternatives	back	into	the	narrative	and	is	thereby	reproducing	the	conditions	for	his	synthesis	not	within	the	 text	but	without	–	a	nothing	 to	 the	apes	–	because	a	 thing	–	 ‘It	 cannot	be	a	
genius!’ 		60					In	previous	commentaries,	the	mutually	assured	destruction	that	ensues	when	these	two	rival	bearers	of	the	sacred	word	go	head	to	head	in	the	chapter	‘Lord	Osmund’s	 Lenten	Party,’	 is	 often	 taken	 to	 indicate	 that	whatever	 Pierpoint	 had	planned	is	somehow	turning	awry.	 ‘Whatever	Pierpoint’s	beliefs	and	intentions,	his	 campaign	 against	 the	 apes	 he	 identiPies	 in	 his	 Encyclical	 is	waged	 through	unreliable	lieutenants’,	states	Edwards.	 ‘Two	of	them	…	are	capable	of	parroting	at	great	length	and	with	great	conviction	Pierpoint’s	Lewisian	analyses	of	the	art	world	 …	 but	 they	 ruin	 the	 show	 at	 Lord	 Osmund’s	 party	 by	 squabbling	 over	unpaid	bills	in	public.’ 	Similar	criticism	is	levelled	at	Lewis’s	other	great	novel	61from	this	period,	The	Childermass	(1928),	 in	which	another	actor	and	magician,	possessed	of	transformative	powers,	squares	off	against	another	Welshman	and	Fascist,	 in	 a	 refugee-camp	 outside	Heaven.	 After	 considerable	 fanfare,	 the	 long	promised	battle	for	reality	seems	about	to	begin	when	the	latter	faction	secure	a	platform;	but	rather	than	‘showing	up’	the	‘Bailiff ’,	exposing	the	magic	tricks	and	
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misconceptions	that	underpin	his	rule,	 these	 ‘Hyperideans’	come	to	realise	that	they	are	in	agreement	with	their	enemy’s	philosophy	or	that	their	key	ideas	have	been	stolen	by	him	and	are	already	being	implemented	(in	what	must	count	as	an	early	example	of	“triangulation”).	Their	conclusion:	 ‘What	a	pity	that	you	are	 in	charge!’ 		62	 	 	 	 	In	contrast,	the	theoretical	framework	set	out	in	this	essay	for	the	evaluation	of	Lewis’s	great	period	must	suggest	that	these	scenes	represent	 in	each	case	a	successful	outcome	for	the	only	participant	of	any	consequence,	the	Ideal	Giant.	To	suggest	that	either	the	apes’	saturnalia	or	the	parliament	of	the	dead	‘should	be	an	epiphany’,	as	previous	commentators	have	suggested,	is	to	miss	the	point	of	the	dialectical	process	Lewis	 took	 from	Stirner. 	 ‘It	was	my	 idea	at	 the	outset’,	63Lewis	recalled	of	The	Art	of	Being	Ruled,	‘inspired	by	the	Hegelian	dialectic,	with	its	thesis	and	antithesis	–	to	state,	here	and	there,	both	sides	of	the	question	to	be	debated,	 and	 allow	 those	 opposites	 to	 struggle	 in	 the	 reader’s	 mind	 for	 the	ascendancy	 and	 there	 to	 Pind	 their	 synthesis’. 	 No	 epiphany	 is	 viable	 inside	 a	64work	of	art	for	the	reason	stated	in	Lewis’s	novel	Tarr	(1928):	
!‘Deadness	 is	 the	 Pirst	 condition	 for	art:	 the	 second	 is	 absence	of	 soul,	 in	the	 human	 and	 sentimental	 sense	 …	 no	 restless	 inPlammable	 ego	 is	imagined	 for	 its	 interior:	 it	 has	no	 inside:	 good	art	must	have	no	 inside:	that	is	capital.’ 		65!Having	demonstrated	that	naïve	egotism	or	chauvinism	in	the	contemporary	use	of	that	term	is	not	that	‘one	synthetic	and	various	ego’	that	comprises	self	and	the	not-self,	 we	 are	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	 perceive	 that	 a	 signal	 victory	 is	 neither	possible	nor	even	desired	for	those	things	in	himself	that	Lewis	Pixed	upon	as	his	‘most	 essential	 ME’. 	 The	 Stirnerian	 dialectical	 method	 is	 not	 essentialist	 but	66nihilist:	aims	not	at	restoration,	but	negation	of	negation.	The	climactic	moment	that	 Starr-Smith	 disrupts	 could	 never	 have	 been	 an	 epiphany	 because	 the	 God	that	 ‘always	desires	to	manifest	himself’	 is	not,	as	Edwards	seems	to	suggest	 in	his	 discussion	 of	 this	 passage,	 Lewis’s	 God,	 but	 a	 natural	 rather	 than	 artiPicial	power,	the	God	of	the	magician	rather	than	the	artist,	making	itself	visible	here	in	the	only	way	it	ever	can:	by	disappearing	the	Subject.	That	is	the	negation	being	negated:	 no	 epiphany	 from	 the	magician	 or	 Shaman,	 but	 a	 series	 of	 vanishing	tricks.	 ‘[All]	 magicians	 dislike	 permanence,	 and	 are	 naturally	 sympathetic	
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towards	 the	 Plux’,	 states	 Lewis	 in	 Time	 and	 Western	 Man.	 ‘For	 operations	involving	 disappearances	 are	 their	métier.	 Nearly	 all	 their	 tricks	 are	 vanishing	
tricks.’ 	67
! *		 *	 *	
!The	Vanish	 in	The	 Apes	 of	 God	may	 be	 taken	 as	 the	 satiric	 counterpart	 to	 that	historical	 process	 that	 Lewis	 had	 already	 charted	 in	 Time	 and	 Western	 Man,	tracking	the	Ego,	‘briePly,	from	where	we	Pind	it	fully	substantival	at	the	opening	of	the	great	period	of	democratic	stir	and	ferment	in	Europe,	down	to	the	time	of	its	 death	 in	 “action”,	 of	 recent	 date’. 	 Having	 insisted	 that	 art	 is	 the	 civilised	68substitute	 for	magic,	Lewis	accuses	 contemporaries	of	wishing	 to	 lead	us	back,	‘by	 means	 of	 art,	 to	 the	 plane	 of	 magic,	 or	 of	 mystical,	 speciPically	 religious,	experience’.	 Instead	of	 embracing	 the	new	possibilities	 presented	by	 artist	 and	scientist	 in	 the	 modern	 phase	 of	 European	 history,	 philosophers	 and	 cultural	critics	 seek	only	 ‘to	 retransform	both	of	 them	 into	 the	primitive	magician	 from	which	 they	both	 equally	 spring,	 or	 rather	 to	 retransform	 their	 chosen	material	into	simple	magic’. 		69	 	 	 	 	Lewis’s	understanding	of	the	dangers	posed	by	this	reversion	to	Shamanism	remains	distinctively	Stirnerian	through	the	interwar	years.	The	impetus	behind	
The	Art	of	Being	Ruled	 is,	Lewis	claims	at	the	outset,	his	desire	to	explode	what	Stirner	terms	causes,	that	category	of	ideas	that	empty	out	the	individual	subject,	so	that	the	latter	becomes	nothing	but	a	walking	idea.	“Dying	for	a	idea”	sounds	well	enough,	writes	Lewis,	but	why	not	let	the	idea	die	instead	of	you. 	The	book	70is	a	diatribe	against	any	word	that	makes	us	strangers	to	ourselves,	installing	‘a	principle	 of	 impersonality	 in	 the	 heart	 of	 our	 life	 that	 is	 anti-vital’. 	 The	 Pinal	71section	 concludes	 with	 an	 echo	 of	 Stirner’s	 contention	 that	 our	 heads	 remain	‘haunted’	by	that	most	oppressive	 ‘spook’	–	Man. 	 ‘Our	minds	are	still	haunted	72by	 that	Abstract	Man,’	Lewis	writes,	 ‘that	enlightened	abstraction	of	 a	 common	humanity,	which	had	its	greatest	advertisement	in	the	eighteenth	century’. 		73	 	 	 	 	But	new	ideas	and	points	of	reference	increasingly	complicate	this	Stirnerian	base.	 In	the	course	of	his	discussion	of	Schopenhauer,	 for	 instance,	Lewis	notes	that	 the	philosopher	defends	 the	 “self”	 from	a	predatory	abstract	 Idealism,	but	
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insists	 ‘the	 individual	 should	be	kept	 in	 the	most	unequivocal	 subordination	 to	his	conception	of	 the	Will’. 	 In	Time	and	Western	Man,	 the	 individual	subject	 is	74threatened	not,	or	not	primarily,	by	 the	 Idea,	but	by	 this	 radical	new	empirical	basis	for	Natural	Science.	Over	the	course	of	a	chapter	titled	‘The	Subject	as	King	of	 the	Psychological	World’,	 Lewis	 traces	 the	 evolution	of	 the	unconscious	mind	from	its	roots	in	the	debates	of	Locke	and	Leibniz,	over	the	Cartesian	statement	that	‘the	soul,	as	a	thinking	being,	must	think	incessantly,’	through	to	the	élan	vital	of	Bergson	and	the	Radical	Empiricism	of	William	James.	‘So	it	is	that	the	Subject	is	 not	 gently	 reasoned	 out	 of,	 but	 violently	 hounded	 from	 every	 cell	 of	 the	organism:	 until	 at	 last	 (arguing	 that	 “independent,”	 individual	 life	 is	 not	worthwhile,	 nor	 the	 game	worth	 the	 candle)	 he	 plunges	 into	 the	Unconscious,’	Lewis	concludes	–	‘where	Dr.	Freud,	like	a	sort	of	mephistophelian	Dr.	Caligari,	is	waiting	 for	him.’ 	 In	another	chapter,	Lewis	even	goes	so	 far	as	to	suggest	 that	75‘Realist’	and	‘Idealist’	can	no	longer	be	said	to	differ	in	any	signiPicant	respect. 		76					In	a	startling	twist	to	the	Stirnerian	historical	schema,	the	rise	of	the	artist	and	the	 scientist	 is	 shown	 to	 have	 brought	 about	 a	 very	 different	 synthesis	 to	 that	predicted	by	Stirner.	No	Ideal	Giant	(the	future	of	the	artist	has	not	materialised)	but	 an	 Ideal	 Comedian:	 ‘In	 dealing	 with	 the	 question	 of	 the	 sense	 of	 personal	
identity,	James	says	that	our	belief	that	the	Me	of	yesterday	is	the	same	as	the	Me	of	today	is	“a	mere	subjective	phenomenon”,’	states	Lewis. 	And	the	Comedian,	in	77the	 picture	 of	 these	 many	 distinct,	 intermittent	 selves,	 Pinds	 his	 professional	paradise.	 ‘For	 all	 comedians	 are	 necessarily	 volatile,	 love	 change	 for	 change’s	sake,	prefer	parasitically	other	personalities	and	other	lives	to	their	own	–	such	is	their	faculty	and	function:	they	would	desire	never	twice	to	be	the	same	thing:	to	have	 at	 their	 disposal	 an	 inPinite	 number	 of	 masks. 	 –	 In	 politics,	 the	 Ideal	78Comedian	 is	said	 to	manifest	as	a	 type	of	Mussolini:	 ‘with	all	 the	 instincts	bred	behind	 the	 footlights,	 the	 apotheosis	 of	 the	 life-of-the-moment,	 of	 exteriorality,	display	 and	 make-up;	 and	 of	 an	 extreme	 instability,	 fundamental	 breaks	 and	intermittences,	 the	 natural	 result	 of	 the	 violent	 changes	 of,	 and	 the	 return	 of	great	chaotic	violences	into,	our	time’.	In	the	arts,	continues	Lewis,	this	tendency	issues	in	the	form	of	prodigious	virtuosity.	 ‘The	work	of	one	person	will	consist	of	 the	 schematic	 juxtaposition	 of	 a	 series	 of	 disconnected	 stylizations;	 and	
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therefore,	since	the	“style	is	the	man,”	of	a	crowd	of	men,	not	one	man	at	all.	So	the	co-existence	is	achieved	of	many	persons	and	times	in	one.’ 		79					Much	of	Lewis’s	Pictional	and	critical	output	in	the	interwar	period	is	devoted	to	the	exposure	of	these	Ideal	Comedians,	and	perhaps	the	most	vicious	of	these	personal	attacks	is	the	‘Analysis	of	the	Mind	of	James	Joyce’	in	Time	and	Western	
Man.	By	far	the	best	known	and	most	widely	quoted	of	Lewis’s	polemical	work,	this	piece	acquires	a	new	signiPicance	within	the	theoretical	context	established	by	this	essay.	In	this	light	it	is	clear	that	Joyce	is	guilty,	not	merely	of	reiterating	like	Gertrude	Stein	the	radical	empiricism	of	William	James,	nor	like	Ezra	Pound,	of	simply	failing	to	understand	the	wider	implications	of	his	creative	practice	(a	‘Revolutionary	Simpleton’).	The	vitriol	directed	at	Joyce	can	now	be	understood	to	 stem	 from	 Lewis’s	 (perhaps	 mistaken)	 perception	 that	Ulysses	 had	 enacted	precisely	 that	 thought-experiment	 we	 Pind	 in	 his	 own	work	 (stating,	 here	 and	there,	both	sides	of	the	question	to	be	debated,	allowing	opposites	to	struggle	in	the	reader’s	mind	 for	 the	ascendancy	–	 there	 to	 Pind	 their	 synthesis)	–	but	had	then	arrived	at	a	markedly	different	result.	As	in	The	Childermass,	a	Celt	with	an	improbable	Greek	name,	representing	a	Classical	or	spatial	mind-set,	goes	head	to	head	with	a	Jew,	embodying	what	Lewis	called	a	time-mind.	But	though	‘urged	by	his	author	to	rise	to	the	occasion	and	live	up	to	the	role	of	the	incarnation	of	the	immaterial,	and	so	be	top-dog	to	Poldy	Bloom’,	Stephen	Dedalus	simply	will	not	grow	into	‘the	protagonist	of	a	battle	between	mighty	principles	of	Spirit	and	Matter’. 	Having	disavowed	this	portrait	of	himself	as	a	young	man,	the	author,	80‘thinly	disguised	as	a	middle-aged	 Jew	tout	 (Mr	Leopold	Bloom)’,	 is	 said	 to	win	the	reader’s	sympathy	every	time	he	appears;	‘is	never	confronted	with	the	less	and	 less	 satisfactory	 Dedalus	 (in	 the	 beau	 role)	without	 the	 latter	 losing	 trick	after	 trick	 to	 his	 disreputable	 rival;	 and	 so,	 to	 the	 dismay	 of	 the	 conscientious	reader,	betraying	the	principles	he	represents.’	Lewis	concludes	that,	 ‘It	 is	a	sad	affair,	 altogether,	 on	 that	 side’. 	 In	 a	 critique	 that	 foreshadows	 the	 existential	81psychology	of	schizophrenia	developed	by	R.D.	Laing,	Lewis	argues	that	ego	must	inevitably	 collapse	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	 (radical	 empiricist)	psychological	method,	the	immense	nature-morte	that	must	result;	‘a	ton	or	two	of	personally	organised	rubbish’.	 	As	Lewis	had	predicted	in	The	Caliph’s	Design	(1919),	the	human	had	82been	overwhelmed	by	 its	 own	 creation	 (or	 as	 he	put	 it	 in	BLAST,	 the	 fraternal	
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moulds	 that	attract	modern	 town-dwellers):	 ‘The	danger,	 as	 it	would	appear	at	present,	and	 in	our	 Pirst	 Plight	of	 substitution	and	remounting,	 is	evidently	 that	we	should	become	overpowered	by	our	creation,	and	become	as	mechanical	as	a	tremendous	 insect	world,	all	our	awakened	reason	[that	distinguishes	the	third	phase	in	the	Lewisian	schematic	history	–	the	time	of	the	New	Ego,	of	the	Artist]	entirely	disappeared’. 		83	 	 	 	 	Lewis’s	frustration	at	Joyce’s	perversion	(as	he	perceived	it)	of	the	dialectical	form	he	had	developed	in	‘Enemy	of	the	Stars’	can	only	have	been	compounded	by	his	knowledge	of	the	extent	to	which	this	 fellow	Man-of-1914	had	grounded	his	creative	project	on	Stirnerian	Egoism.	Both	had	been	published	in	The	Egoist	by	Dora	Marsden,	 and	 as	Bruce	Clarke	has	 shown	 in	his	 book	on	 the	 editor,	 in	Joyce’s	 case	 at	 least,	 this	 was	 because	A	 Portrait	 of	 the	 Artist	 as	 a	 Young	Man	realised	her	vision	of	a	 literature	that	would	constitute	a	psychology	of	Egoism.	Joyce	cites	Stirner	as	a	major	inPluence	on	his	thought	in	a	note	to	his	biographer	Herbert	Gorman,	and	the	philosopher’s	inPluence	is	pervasive	in	this	Pirst	novel,	which	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 conform	 closely	 to	 that	 step-by-step	 account	 of	 a	 typical	individual’s	psychological	development	set	out	in	the	Pirst	chapter	of	The	Ego	and	
His	Own. 	Like	Stirner’s	Egoist,	Stephen	Dedalus	passes	on	from	an	initial	phase	84in	which	he	is	subject	to	physical	tyrannies	of	family	and	school,	only	then	to	fall	under	the	spiritual	dominion	of	the	Church.	Having	freed	himself	from	the	latter,	Stephen	must	 resist	 its	 humanitarian	 reiterations	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 his	 goal:	that	is	(like	the	Lewisian	Egoist)	to	become	his	own	Artist.	Earlier	versions	of	the	
Portrait	 can	be	seen	 to	draw	yet	more	heavily	on	Stirnerian	 theory	–	as	Michel	Rabate	has	recently	demonstrated.	‘It	was	part	of	that	ineradicable	egoism	which	he	was	afterwards	to	call	redeemer,’	writes	Joyce,	‘that	he	imagined	converging	to	him	all	the	deeds	and	thoughts	of	the	microcosm’. 	And	in	Rabate’s	opinion,	‘This	85thought	 cannot	 simply	 be	 ascribed	 to	 youthful	 enthusiasm,	 since	we	 Pind	 it	 in	Stephen’s	mouth	at	the	close	of	Ulysses,	in	“Eumaeus”,	when	Stephen	declares	to	a	bafPled	Bloom	‘that	Ireland	must	be	important	because	it	belongs	to	[him].’ 		86					In	his	Lacanian	reading	of	Joyce’s	oeuvre,	Rabate	argues	that	the	move	toward	the	decentred	subjectivity	one	encounters	in	Finnegans	Wake	does	not	represent	the	rejection	of	Stirnerian	Egoism	for	a	Radical	Empiricism,	but	the	culmination	of	the	former	through	the	latter.	In	Stirner’s	philosophy,	the	ego	as	posited	(or	in	
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Lewisian	terms,	the	persona,	insofar	as	it	possesses	existence,	is	appearance,	and	is	essence	(that	is	to	say,	is	the	creator	of	a	persona	thus	posited)	only	insofar	as	it	does	not	exist.	And	from	the	earliest	versions	of	A	Portrait,	Joyce	had	conPlated	ego	with	negation	in	a	pun	that	can	be	understood	to	have	anticipated	everything	that	would	 follow	 in	 the	Wake:	 ‘His	 ‘Nego	…	written	amid	a	chorus	of	peddling	Jews’	gibberish	and	Gentile	clamour,’	writes	Joyce,	‘was	drawn	up	valiantly	while	true	believers	prophesied	fried	atheism	and	was	hurled	against	the	obscene	hells	of	our	Holy	Mother’. 	In	that	picture	of	many	distinct	intermittent	selves	we	Pind	87in	the	Wake,	we	should	perceive,	not	disintegration	of	ego,	but	multiplication:	‘a	grammar	 of	 egoism	 –	 in	 which	 the	 active	 and	 passive	 voices	 keep	 revolving	around	a	mobile	subjective	center.’ 	For	Rabate,	this	lability	of	the	“I”	is	derived	88from	the	key	property	of	a	Stirnerian	Unique	who	is	also	causa	sui.	 	‘Throughout	his	career,	the	strategy	adopted	by	Joyce	will	remain	the	same:	by	hiding	under	the	 tables	 of	 the	 Law,	 he	 multiplies	 his	 “I’s”	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 frightening	beaks’.	In	the	Wake	–	as	in	Freud’s	Interpretation	of	Dreams	–	ego	is	represented	several	times	over	and	in	various	forms	because	–	in	the	view	of	both	Joyce	and	Freud	–	‘Dreams	are	completely	egotistical’. 		89	 	 	 	 	A	Lewisian	reading	of	the	Joycean	dream-work	must	be	at	one	with	Lacan	on	this	score:	–	no	work	of	art	 that	does	not	result	 from	the	 free	action	of	a	 living	Subject.	To	accept	Rabate’s	interpretation	of	Joyce’s	work,	as	sharing	a	common	basis	in	the	egoist	philosophy	of	Max	Stirner,	is	to	acquire	a	new	understanding	of	the	Lewisian	critique	as	a	sectarian	action;	the	speciPic	thrust	of	the	argument	is	more	precise	once	it	is	recognised	that	the	Joycean	dream-work	is	not	an	alien	system	of	thought,	that	Lewis	is	gunning	not	for	an	enemy	without	but	within:	a	purge,	a	pogrom;	this	dispute	is	fraternal,	taking	issue	not	with	the	fundamental	beliefs	underpinning	the	creation	of	Finnegans	Wake,	but	with	their	application.	Lewis	resists	the	suggestion,	advanced	again	later	in	the	century	by	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	that	there	is	radical	potential	in	this	egalitarian	dispersal	of	the	Subject;	that	is	to	say,	in	a	failure	to	distinguish	between	that	which	is	your	self	and	that	which	is	your	own,	those	properties	of	the	ego,	on	the	part	of	the	schizophrenic,	or	Schizoid.		
! *		 *	 *	
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!In	the	rigorous	steps	to	police	this	distinction	introduced	in	The	Childermass	and	
The	Apes	of	God	we	have	seen	that	Lewis	presents	a	compelling	alternative	to	a	radical	subjectivity	often	taken	to	represent	the	mainstream	of	Modernism	(and	typically	attributed	to	the	Radical	Empiricism	of	James	and	Bergson).	In	closing,	I	would	like	to	point	out	problems	inherent	in	the	dialectical	procedure	developed	by	Lewis.	In	eliminating	the	confusion	of	self	and	property	that	entangles	Arghol	in	 ‘The	Enemy	of	the	Stars’,	Lewis	inevitably	projects	into	the	work	an	essential	ME	–	a	portrait	of	the	artist	–	perhaps	less	like	the	one	synthetic	and	various	ego	that	created	the	work	than	the	Domestic	Adversary	–	the	shamans	or	magicians	that	possess	all	of	that	transformative	energy	proper	to	the	artist	in	every	living	thing.			 	 	 	 	In	what	is	perhaps	the	most	extraordinary	scene	in	Lewis’s	phantasmagoria,	his	answer	to	Finnegans	Wake,	the	Bailiff	is	seen	to	sink	back	into	a	painting	that	serves	as	the	backcloth	to	his	booth,	merging	in	the	form	of	the	divinity	depicted	there:	the	adolescent	god	of	Thrace,	with	leopard-skin	and	thyrsus,	worshipped	in	the	Orphic	Mysteries:	‘The	Thracian	divinity	skoal-drinks	with	dashing	nordic	abandon	then	crashes	the	goblet	down	bottom-up,	true	Thracian-Norse,	upon	the	shelf	before	him.’ 	In	stark	contrast,	that	faithful	portrait	of	the	Artist,	Hyperides,	90though	 likened	 in	 appearance	 to	 Michelangelo,	 is	 immobile,	 inert;	 bound	 to	support	 a	 Lewisian	 line	 on	 art,	 he	 is	 required	 to	 communicate	 a	 vision	 that	 is	diametrically	opposed	to	everything	he	is:	‘stretched	out	in	the	relaxed	repose	of	the	Sistine	Adam	[his]	Pinger	points	inertly	forward	as	though	waiting	the	touch	of	the	hurrying	Jehovah.’ 	In	preventing	an	indiscriminate	confusion	of	self	and	91world,	Lewis	inevitably	appears	to	have	relinquished	the	mercurial	properties	of	the	living	ego	that	make	possible	art.	If	Joyce	is	taken	to	represent	a	pantheistic	dispersal,	 blurring	 into	 the	 contours	 of	 his	 dream	 landscape,	 present	 in	 every	river,	tree	and	hill,	Lewis	is	(to	paraphrase	W.H.	Auden)	too	easily	taken	for	that	
lonely	 volcano	 on	 the	 right…	 (‘The	 mountains	 were	 an	 idea	 of	 mine!’	 says	 the	Bailiff.	‘They	are	as	a	matter	of	fact	from	Iceland,	volcanic	as	you	see	I	daresay	–	that	is	the	Skapta	Jokul	…	’ )		92	 	 	 	 	And	perhaps	this	is	no	mistake.	In	his	pre-war	writing	Lewis	had	identiPied	himself	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	with	the	Pinal	stage	in	Stirner’s	evolution;	his	
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shamanic	Pigures	from	the	North,	Kerr-Orr	and	Arghol,	had	struggled	against	or	tried	to	accommodate	those	bullet-like	egos	encountered	where	Africa	begins.	In	the	post-war	writing,	Lewis	took	issue	with	the	resulting	synthesis	and	fought	for	Ideal	 Giant	 against	 Ideal	 Comedian.	Hurling	 his	weight	 behind	 the	 Thracian	 or	Phrygian	horsemen	that	Pirst	shattered	the	shamanic/orphic	system	of	sex-magic	in	ancient	Bulgaria,	Lewis	championed	the	Lion	over	the	Fox,	in	order	to	secure	a	result	like	the	Greek	synthesis	or	Italian	renaissance.	But	whatever	synthesis	this	author	 envisaged	happening	outside	 the	 text	must	necessarily	 remain	 just	 that,	happening	 only	 if	 the	 reader	 takes	 the	 considerable	 time	 and	 effort	 to	make	 it	happen.	And	unfortunately,	what	 readers	actually	 encounter	 in	Lewis’s	writing,	until	 the	 thirties	at	 least,	 is	precisely	 that	 inertness	 (that	 Pixity,	 that	mortmain)	now	 associates	with	 the	 art	 produced	 under	 fascism.	 The	 opening	 sequence	 in	Leni	 Riefenstahl’s	 Olympia	 (1938);	 those	 unmoving	 tableaus,	 ‘like	 a	 spirited	salon-picture’,	 Lewis	 ridiculed	 in	 Pound’s	 ‘Canto	 XVII’;	 the	 six	 characters	 in	search	of	 an	author,	 in	 the	play	of	 that	name	by	Luigi	Pirandello.	This	material	history	is	no	less	dead,	no	less	a	nature-morte,	for	being	said	to	follow	on,	rather	than	constitute,	the	passage	through	time	of	an	ego,	our	Angelus	Novus,	the	artist.	
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